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Abstract  
This article focuses primarily on analyzing the possible relation between infrastructure management projects under a 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) and X-Inefficiency. The premise of our empirical analysis is that some methods of 
contract awarding for selecting the right private sector partner, when subject to competition and transparency 
(competitive bidding), may contribute to the overall infrastructure goals of countries in general and in particular to 
reducing X-Inefficiency. For measuring, we assume that at least some decision making units (DMU) are successfully 
practicing maximization, while others may not be. The database covers projects awarded in low- and middle income 
countries as classified by the World Bank and our initial sample consisted of 210 electricity generation [1] projects 
(energy sector). The results show that award methods based on direct negotiation have a positive effect on increasing 
technical efficiency (or decreasing X-Inefficiency) compared to alternative methods like competitive bidding.  
Keywords: low- and middle income countries, Public-Private Partnership (PPP), X-Inefficiency, panel data, energy 
sector  
JEL Classification: M21, L14, L32, C24  
1. Introduction  
According to several authors (Aschauer (1990), Gramlich (1994), Esfahani and Ramıreź (2003), Romp and De Haan 
(2007), Irmen and Kuehnel (2009), Égert et al. (2009), and more recently Calderon et al. (2014)), infrastructure brings 
greater economic returns on investment than many other forms of capital expenditure. It is also well recognized as 
having a lasting impact on long term prospects for economic growth.  
Nevertheless, when the time comes for investments in infrastructure to be made, the old state versus market dichotomy 
that has long dominated the economic debate once again emerges. The arguments for and against such a system are 
varied. One side argues to justify state intervention in the economy while others contend that the market is the best 
instrument for achieving general welfare.  
In any case, there is evidence that these investments, whether public or private, and the provision of public goods has a 
positive effect on aggregate demand and social welfare as long as inflation does not increase. This generates a lack of 
competitiveness and has negative effects on the external sector and creates a fiscal deficit that leads to debt problems.  
To avoid many of the unwanted macroeconomic and sector based effects that public investment and state provisions of 
public goods and services can cause in the economy, the traditional relationships between the public and private sectors 
have developed to achieve a counter-cyclical growth thrust, improved efficiency, and ultimately a better distribution 
welfare. It is in this context that during the 1980s, a new way of looking at the relationship between the State and the 
market was born. This idea spread quickly, creating what has been called the Public-Private Partnership.  
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangements are a relatively new instrument –arising in the 1970s as the result of 
popular concerns about increased public spending that dominated political debate in English speaking countries. 
However, the PPP methodology is applied more often in less developed countries, especially in sectors related to 
infrastructure. Grimsey and Lewis (2004a) discuss the role and give an overall assessment of Public-Private 
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Partnerships1 (PPPs) in emerging markets, assuming a lack of budgetary resources and vast infrastructure needs in 
these economies. Therefore, PPPs remain an attractive policy option for achieving several social, commercial, and 
environmental goals (Grimsey and Lewis (2004). Regarding the social aspect, PPPs can be designed to ensure that the 
private sector shares its learning experiences, contributes to technology transfer, and helps the public sector acquire new 
abilities. Commercially, the benefits of PPPs allow for infrastructure completion deadlines to be shortened and reduce 
the risk of experiencing delays when circulation channels for goods and services are put into operation. Finally, when 
considering environmental issues, projects carried out under a PPP can, through the regulatory experience of the public 
sector, improve energy efficiency and biodiversity as well as reduce pollution.  
However, in line with Grimsey and Lewis (2004) and Auriol and Picard (2008), there are some problems with this type 
of arrangement that must be overcome. As examples, possible difficulties in putting together a cost effective financial 
package, the restricted financial flexibility of the public sector arising from the commitment of funds under the PPP 
contract, high transaction costs in the development stage, and the absence of a reliable commercial and legal framework 
in emerging economies. Another relevant issue is the possible existence of X-Inefficiency2 as a result of contract 
awarding methods based on direct negotiation instead of competitive bidding.  
X-Inefficiency can occur when managing infrastructure projects under Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). See Marques 
and Berg (2010); Vining and Boardman, (2008a, b). These articles highlight this aspect, and usually on the empirical 
analysis of selected projects to test a possible relation between infrastructure management projects under a PPP and 
X-inefficiency. First, we provide a brief overview on the different ways that the private sector can be involved in 
financing infrastructures in emerging markets. Afterwards, using an initial sample of 210 electricity generation projects 
from a database that covers projects awarded in low- and middle income countries as classified by the World Bank, we 
assume that at least some decision making units (DMU) are successfully practicing maximization, while other may not 
be.  
The results show that the methods based on direct negotiation have a positive effect on increasing technical efficiency 
(or decreasing X-Inefficiency) compared to alternative methods like competitive bidding. In this regard, the results 
show some policy implications that could be significant since under these circumstances, direct negotiation could 
theoretically help save the government money.  
In the next section, we provide a brief background. In the third section, an empirical analysis of selected projects is 
offered and the data, methodology, and results of the study are presented. Finally, some considerations and policy 
implications are offered.  
2. Financing Infrastructures in Emerging Markets  
Governments, international development agencies, and financial institutions have worked to develop techniques to 
lower infrastructure project risks by providing structured project financing and credit from specialized financial 
institutions that allow for equity and debt mobilization by fashioning the finance to the specific infrastructure project 
and to ensure that risks are not borne by the sponsor alone, but shared with different types of investors, like equity 
holders, debt providers, or quasi equity investors. Credit enhancement via mechanisms that reduce project risks make 
borrowers more confident (such as subordinated debt securities) when offering either government level or multilateral 
development bank guarantees and equity contributions or PPPs with direct government equity support. Governments 
often offer minimum profit guarantees, special tax treatment, or subordinated royalties while development banks offer 
guarantees through some form of insurance to private investors via capital that governments already have in these 
banks.  
Several factors need to be taken into account if these techniques are to be developed and successfully implemented, 
including:  
i. The legal framework, which must be set up to protect private sector interests, as in many developing countries this 
framework does not exist. Therefore, robust systems of laws and trade regulations must be set up to provide the 
system with a guarantee3. 
                                                        
1This term usually refers to agreements or contracts between the public and the private sector to jointly operate and/or own 
infrastructure projects. It could apply to existing assets (a company) or a new one that will be constructed by the 
partnership.  
2X-Inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966) occurs when an institution has little incentive to control costs, which causes the 
average cost of production to be higher than necessary. With this lack of incentive, the institution will not be efficient.  
3For a correct interpretation of the legal framework its necessary to distinguish at least two aspects; the first one is related 
to the various categories of agreement for public-private partnership that extend from strictly public, through 
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ii. Limits on financial indebtedness established by state, local, and municipal governments in order to avoid making 
commercial banks incur long term commitments which are common in PPPs4; and finally,  
iii. Tax and accounting systems, which must be designed to ensure that the PPPs work properly, as in many cases 
neither the taxes nor the accounting are appropriate for this method of project management and implementation.  
However, designing a credible framework is not enough to attract funds. Incentives are also essential for promoting cost 
containment and economic efficiency, especially because the users of infrastructure services need to accept the validity 
of the public–private arrangements and feel that they are paying prices based on the services received.  
According to Berg et al. (2002) and Grimsey and Lewis (2004), three main factors,  legitimacy, credibility, and 
efficiency, are essential to sustain public and private collaboration in infrastructure development. Focusing on the third 
factor (efficiency), evidence that these authors presented regarding developed economies suggests that PPPs can bring 
efficiency gains and cost savings compared to traditional procurement. However, it is important to distinguish that these 
benefits are different depending on how they are analyzed: by allocation efficiency, technical efficiency, or scale 
efficiency.  
3. An Empirical Analysis in the Electricity Generation Sector  
Several works, consider selecting the right private sector partner to be a critical issue in PPPs in developing 
international infrastructure5, Erdogdu, E. (2011).  
Zhang (2005) focuses in the analysis of several studies about critical factors considering the international experience in 
PPP and lessons learnt, as well as the evaluation of interviews of academic experts and practitioners with experience. 
The investigation analyzes the relative importance each criteria has among the whole package and the relative 
importance each package has in the complete questioner’s structure. The results could help developed a general 
methodology where a multi-criterion best value source selection technique (BVSS) can be used.  
Aziz (2007) studied PPPs in the United Kingdom, Canada and British Columbia, which goes beyond the traditional 
approximation about critical factors analysis and includes legal, political and cultural features as well. Aziz (2007) 
produces a guide for project implementation that measures the degree of success of each project while accounting for 
the principles that could characterize the implementation phase of the PPPs at the program level.  
According to Kwak (2009), PPPs offer new and long term business opportunities with a chance to deliver infrastructure 
services of higher quality and efficiency. However, these benefits will only be materialized when a PPP project is 
properly planned and managed and both the public and private sectors work together successfully.  
In a study conducted in Malaysia, Ismail (2013) showed that ―good governance‖, ―commitment of the public and 
private sectors‖, ―favorable legal framework‖, ―sound economic policy‖ and ―availability of finance market‖ are the top 
five success factors of PPP implementation. On the other hand, although the rankings of many factors were different 
between the public and private sectors, the author does not find significant differences in the perception of the public 
and private sectors concerning the importance of virtually all of the success factors.  
Finally, Ogunsanmi (2016), showed that Critical Success Factors (CSFs), such as commitment and responsibility of public 
and private sectors, strong private consortium and realistic cost/benefit assessment amongst others are critical for PPP 
implementation. Under this circumstance, the premise of our empirical analysis is that some methods of contract awarding 
for selecting the right private sector partner, when subject to competition and transparency (competitive bidding), may 
contribute to the overall infrastructure goals of countries in general and in particular to reducing X-Inefficiency, especially 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
public-private. (Management Contract, Leases and affermage, Build Operate Transfer (BOT), Joint Ventures). The 
second aspect differentiates the PPP from other public-private partnership is achieved by distinguishing between 
contractual associations and institutional associations. (Beuve et ál, 2014) 
The first imply the existence of a contract and among the most common are the infrastructure concessions (Latin term) 
contracts, similar to Design Build Finance Operate (DFBO) in the UK. In the case of institutional partnerships, however, 
both parties (public and private) are involved in a management entity. A paradigmatic example of institutional 
management companies are mixed economy companies of highways in France. Given that the differences in legal 
constitution can lead to misunderstanding, the most important to bear in mind in the definition of a PPP is that the two 
parties have responsibilities, take risks in the execution of contracts and therefore derive benefits. 
4At country level, global finance limits applied to the amount of indebtedness of state, regional, or local government 
entities may inhibit or even prevent private commercial banks from incurring the long term commitments typical in PPPs. 
5This literature addresses various selection criteria in order to evaluate packages for PPP projects. In general, they are: 
financial, technical, safety, health, environmental, and managerial criteria.  
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when governments have a low technical capacity for selecting projects based on direct negotiation.  
Additionally, a second issue is to clarify the distinction between different types of efficiency: the so called allocation 
efficiency or the improved technical efficiency. The former has a direct effect on prices and directly generates a higher 
level of well-being whereas the latter depends on the correct use of the factors of production, but also on the scale and 
the field of production.  
3.1 Methodology  
According to Leibenstein and Maital (1992: 433), ―Data Envelopment Analysis6 (DEA) is a model built explicitly on 
maximization. How then can use as an empirical methodology for measuring X-Inefficiency? The answer is by 
assuming that at least some decision making units (DMU) are successfully maximizing while others may not be.‖  
Although there is no consensus among researchers regarding the way to establish the process for evaluating the 
influence of Public–Private Partnerships in Financing Infrastructure Development variables on service efficiency levels, 
this research attempts to detect the repercussion of certain exogenous factors on the efficiency levels by using a two 
stage process made up of the following steps:  
i. Obtain the Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) efficiency index. In order to calculate efficiency, the behavior of 
each unit observed is optimized, thus determining the efficient production frontier by means of linear segments 
based on the Decision Making Units (DMUs) that operate with the best practices. This corresponds to the set of 
units considered efficient in Pareto’s terms. Therefore, the only requirement established is that each DMU should 
belong to the frontier envelopment (Cooper, Park and Yu, 2001).  
ii. Estimate a truncated regression. The choice was made to estimate this dependency model because, according to 
the results of Simar and Wilson (2007), it provides better statistical inference than the Tobit regression does. The 
linear regression model we consider has the form:  
𝜗𝑖 =  𝑧𝑖𝛽 +  𝜀𝑖                                            (1) 
Where the 𝜀𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) is identically, independently distributed for all i =1,….,m. The left hand side variable is said to 
be censored when, instead of observing for 𝜗𝑖 all observations, we observe:  
𝜃𝑖 = {
𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  >  𝑐𝑖
𝑐𝑖 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
In this case, 𝜗 is left censored at the constant 𝑐𝑖, which may vary across observations. Alternatively, 𝜗 is said to be 
truncated if we observe 𝜃𝑖 =  𝜗𝑖 for all 𝜗𝑖 ≥  𝑐𝑖, but observe nothing otherwise.  
In the case of truncation, if the 𝜗𝑖 are assumed normal with left truncation at 𝑐𝑖 , 𝛽 in (1) can be estimated by 
maximizing the likelihood function:  
ℓ1 =  ∏
1
𝜎𝜀
 𝜙 (
𝜃𝑖− 𝑧𝑖 𝛽
𝜎𝜀
)𝑛𝑖=1 *1 −  Φ (
𝑐𝑖− 𝑧𝑖 𝛽
𝜎𝜀
)+ .−1                           (2) 
Where and 𝜙(. ) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Φ (. ) represent the standard normal density and distribution functions, respectively.  
In our case 𝜗𝑖 represent the dependent variable under two specifications. First, technical efficiency index (considering 
one output ―Capacity‖ and one input ―Total Investment‖) and second, scale efficiency index. Finally 𝑧𝑖  is a vector of 
independent variables like Percent Private Funding, Debt Equity Grant Ratio, and several control variables (Award 
Method, Renewable Energy, and PPP Type).  
3.2 Data and Key Variables  
To conduct our analysis, we employed the Private Participation in Infrastructure Database7 generated by the World 
Bank. The database records contractual arrangements with and without investments in which private parties assume 
operating risks in low- and middle income countries. However, projects included in the database do not have to be 
                                                        
6DEA also computes the distance between DMU performance and the efficient frontier (see Figure A1 in the statistical 
appendix), while dividing up the causes of inefficiency amongst the contributing inputs in a manner that leads to their 
reduction, or eventually, their elimination. For more details about this technique, see Charnes et al. (1978).  
  
7For a more detailed description, see the expanded: http://ppi.worldbank.org/resources/ppi_methodology_ expanded.aspx  
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entirely privately owned, financed, or operated (some involve public participation as well).  
In most cases, the investment amounts in the database represent the total amount of investment commitments entered 
into by the project entity at the signing of the contract or financial closure8 (the present study focuses on the year 2012), 
not the annual investments that were planned or made.  
The database covers projects awarded in low- and middle income countries as classified by the World Bank, and focuses 
on sectors with some monopoly or oligopoly characteristics (energy, telecommunications, transport, and water). 
Countries are also placed into one of six regions (East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa).  
Our initial sample consisted of 210 electricity generation9 projects (energy sector). However, one project was 
eliminated as the total investment, compared to the rest of the projects, allowed us to consider it an outlier (their basic 
statistics for all samples –Table A1; and these statistics at the country level – Table A2).  
The key variables used are listed in the next table 1.  
Table 1. Key variables.  
Variable  Definition  
Capacity (output)  It is the size of a project measured in the units of the capacity type assigned to the project. For 
electricity generation, the capacity quoted is usually the one expected when project becomes fully 
operational.  
Installed megawatts are used for electricity generation projects (1).  
Total Investment 
(input)  
It is the sum of investment in physical assets (2) and payments (3) to the government. Investments 
are recorded in millions of US dollars.  
Percent Private 
Funding  
The percentage of the project company that is owned by private sponsors. Data on private shares 
are cumulative and reflect annual changes. Private share data are entered for all years available in 
the project history table, even if it has not changed. For the years in which there is no change in 
the private share, the latest available value is used.  
Debt Equity Grant 
Ratio  
Debt ratios measure the ability of the business to repay long term debt.  
The debt to equity ratio shows the proportion of capital invested by the business owners to the 
funds provided by external lenders. It gives a comparison of how much of the business was 
financed by owners’ equity and how much was financed through debt or liabilities. The formula 
used to calculate the debt to equity ratio is: Total Liabilities ÷ Owners' Equity  
Dummy Award 
Method:  
This is the method that the government used to award the contract to a private consortium. The 
options are: 1 = Direct negotiation; 2 = Competitive bidding.  
Dummy 
Renewable 
Energy: 1 = yes  
Renewable energy is generally defined as energy that comes from resources which are naturally 
replenished on a human timescale such as sunlight, wind, rain, tides, waves, and geothermal heat. 
Renewable energy replaces conventional fuels in distinct areas like generating electricity. The 
options are: 1 = Yes; 2 = No.  
Dummy PPP 
Type.  
A public–private partnership (PPP) involves several contracted services. The options are: 1 = 
Services contracted by users; 2 = Services contracted by the government.  
Notes:  
(1) (1) While investment figures are either reported on total commitment basis in the year of financial closure or annual flows for some 
projects, capacity size information is cumulative.  
(2) (2) Payments to the government (formerly known as Investment in Government Assets): Resources the project company spends on 
acquiring government assets such as state owned enterprises, rights to provide services in a specific area, or the use of specific radio 
spectrums. License fees, canon payments, or divestiture revenues are the common revenue collection mechanisms. Investments are 
recorded in millions of US dollars.  
(3) (3) Investment in physical assets (formerly known as investment in facilities): Resources the project company commits to invest in 
facilities during the contract period. Investments can be either in new facilities or in expansion and modernization of existing 
facilities. Data entry varies across sectors.  
(4) For projects other than telecommunications and large energy utilities, the total cost of developing or expanding the facility during 
the contract period is entered as investment data in the year of financial closure (this type of data is typically available).  
(5) For telecommunications projects and some large energy utilities, annual investments on facility expansion and modernization are 
entered as investment data in the year of investment when information is publicly available.  
(6) Investments are recorded in millions of US dollars in either the year of financial closure or year of investment, as indicated above.  
Source: Authors’ calculation from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. The World Bank. 
 
                                                        
8Closure occurs when there is a legally binding commitment of private sponsors to mobilize funding or provide services. 
The definition of financial or contractual closure varies among types of private participation as a result of the availability 
of public information.  
9Facilities needed for production of electricity, including the power plant.  
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Source: Authors’ creation from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. The World Bank.  
In Figure 1 we have classified the countries according to their technical and scale efficiencies. In the upper right 
quadrant, we find countries with high levels of both efficiency measures, we can see that only Albania is located in this 
quadrant.  
Table 3 shows large differences between groups by income level when we compare the current values of Technical 
Efficiency with VRS. Note the value for low income countries (49%) is almost twice the values seen by lower middle- 
and upper middle income countries.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics by income level: Mean values.  
Income Group  TE (CRS)  TE 
(VRS)  
SE  Capacity  Total 
Investment 
  
Percent 
Private  
Funding  
Debt Equity 
Grant  
Ratio  
Low income  0.148  0.493  0.296  171.55  179.26  100.00  2.21  
Lower middle 
income  
0.081  0.276  0.347  90.85  164.03  98.27  2.64  
Upper middle 
income  
0.071  0.235  0.351  114.34  234.43  97.38  2.66  
Notes: TE (CRS): Technical Efficiency with Constant Returns to Scale.     
TE (VRS): Technical Efficiency with Variable Returns to Scale.  
SE: Scale SE:Efficiency in terms of CRS/VRS. 
Source: Authors’ calculation from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. The World Bank.  
Table 4 also shows large differences between Technical Efficiency with VRS values when we compare IDA12 status 
groups. Note that the value for the IDA status group (38%) is almost double that of the non-IDA status group.  
Table 4. Descriptive statistics by IDA status: Mean values.  
IDA Status  TE  
(CRS) 
  
TE  
(VRS) 
  
SE  Capacity  Total  
Investment 
  
Percent  
Private  
Funding  
Debt  
Equity  
Grant  
Ratio  
Blended  0.088  0.298  0.328  93.60  136.94  98.85  2.62  
IDA  0.114  0.385  0.355  107.61  132.73  97.86  2.27  
Non-IDA  0.070  0.231  0.353  114.98  244.13  97.45  2.69  
Source: Authors’ calculation from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. The World Bank.  
In Table 5 we estimate several truncated regression models13. Concerning contract awarding methods, we conclude that 
projects that use direct negotiation have higher technical efficiency with VRS (see models 1-4). The significant positive 
effects that we found could be related to a reduction in X-Inefficiency. As we will discuss in the next section, this result 
could be due to the positive relationship between competitive award methods for selecting projects and a reduction in 
X-Inefficiency measured in terms of technical efficiency.  
Finally, we conclude that Renewable Energy projects have lower technical efficiency with VRS (see models 1-4) but 
higher scale efficiency (see models 5-8). However, the impact of the debt equity grant ratio is the opposite (i.e., lower 
debt equity grant ratios have a positive and significant effect on technical efficiency with VRS (see models 1-4), and 
projects with the lowest ratios have a higher scale efficiency. See models 5-8.  
 
                                                        
12 Eligibility for IDA support depends first and foremost on a country’s poverty level, which is defined by having a GNI per capita 
below an annually established threshold (in fiscal year 2014: $1,205). Some countries are IDA- eligible based on per capita income 
levels and are also creditworthy for some IBRD borrowing. They are referred to as ―blend‖ countries.  
13 According to the results of Simar and Wilson (2007:59), it provides better statistical inference than the Tobit regression does.  
Business and Management Studies                                                                Vol. 2, No. 3; 2016 
16 
 
Table 5. Truncated regression models. 
Model 
 
Technical 
Efficiency 
VRS (1) 
Technical Efficiency 
VRS 
(2) 
Technical Efficiency 
VRS (3) 
Technical Efficiency 
VRS (4) 
Scale 
Efficiency RCS/VRS 
(5) 
Scale 
Efficiency RCS/VRS 
(6) 
Scale 
Efficiency RCS/VRS 
(7) 
Scale 
Efficiency 
RCS/VRS (8) 
Variables Coef./ Std. 
Err. 
Coef./ Std. Err. Coef./ Std. Err. Coef./ Std. Err. Coef./ Std. Err. Coef./ Std. Err. Coef./ Std. Err. Coef./ Std. Err. 
Percent Private Funding 0.0017513 
0.0021045 
.0009925 
.0011591  
.0010452 .0012392  .0011474 .0012406 .0025372  .0018022 .0018899  .0016659 .0023977  .0018305 .0023841  .001828
3 
Dummy Award Method: 
1 = Direct negotiation 
0.1780643*** 
0.047732 
.2136556*** 
.0416981 
.1662854*** .036108
5  
.1741172***  .03481
5 
.0757641  .0462875  -.0151909  .0604186 .0675307  .055194 .0675307  .053408
8 
Dummy Renewable 
Energy: 1 = yes 
-0.3691624**
* 
0.063281 
-.6428261*** 
.0708779 
-.2364492***  .0511
583 
-.2293151***  .0484
644 
.1735176**  .07698
63 
.3466035***  .1304
278 
.1814257**  .094260
2 
.1872042**  .0906
529 
Debt Equity Grant Ratio -0.03846* 
0.0207209 
-.0371434*** 
.012666 
-.0183329  .0124551  -.0186099  .0125052  
-.0210845  .017858
2  
-.0093979  .0170997 -.0194824  .0180545 -.0191718  .018099
8 
Dummy PPP Type: 1= 
Services contracted by 
users 
-0.0143838 
0.1254386 
-.0525271  .0809769  .0010151  .0855136  .0026845  .085597 -.0555451  .130076
3 
-.0144339  .1198243 -.0566756  .1297666 -.0567939  .129702
8 
Europe and Central Asia  -.3759675***  .0963
716   
   -.0681815  .1639404   
Latin America & the 
Caribbean 
 .1297789  .0868762     -.3101472**  .13534
77 
  
Middle East and North 
Africa 
 -.4323741***  .1021
418  
   -.0076928  .1669298   
South Asia  .1128659*  .063365    -.199945* .1023876    
Sub-Saharan Africa  .1162665  .0747708     -.2877411**  .11770
44 
  
Lower middle-income   -.5288829***  .1301
688 
   -.0418768***  .1738
373 
 
Upper middle-income   -.5439963***  .1240
02  
   -.0591267***  .1628
3 
 
Dummy IDA status: 1= 
IDA 
   .5457446***  .12656
43  
   .0475083  .166912
8  
Dummy IDA Status: 2 = 
Non-IDA 
   -.0008975  .0324928     
-.0183268  .049396
7 
Cons 0.4440291** 
0.2222576 
.6818142***  .13382
32  
.8808117***  .16774
98 
.3254417**  .140936
7  
-.0783085  .198153
5  
.0481123  .2008878 -.0231336  .227874 -.069716  .2159973 
Sigma 0.1147018*** 
0.0170144 
.0738534***  .00939
42 
.0789573*** .010298
2 
.079073***  .010308
5 
.1193761***  .0154
029 
.1091449  .0136786 .1190166*** 
.0153438 
.1189662 
*** .0153351 
Wald chi2 48.40 152.45 101.19 100.92 10.90 18.74 11.10 11.14 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0535 0.0437 0.1341 0.1328 
Log likelihood 36.290377   48.936565  46.68909  46.59774  30.090202 33.157842 30.215518 30.230173  
Num. of obs 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: 
Limit: lower = 0, upper = 1. Dummy Award Method: variable competitive bidding omitted. Dummy Renewable Energy: variable no renewable energy omitted. Dummy variable PPP type: variable services contracted by the government 
omitted. Dummy region: region East Asia and Pacific omitted. Dummy IDA status: variable Blended omitted. Dummy income level: variable Low-income omitted. VRS: variable returns to scale. 
Source: Authors’ calculation from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. The World Bank. 
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications  
Our empirical results show that award methods based on direct negotiation have a positive effect on increasing technical 
efficiency (or decreasing X-Inefficiency) compared to alternative methods like competitive bidding.  
Of course, these are preliminary findings, however, their relevance in terms of policy implications could be significant. 
A complementary analysis of this issue that considers additional sectors and methodologies to estimate technical 
efficiency might be useful. A deeper analysis at the micro level of the characteristics of different award methods might 
be significant.   
On the other hand, some authors like Hodges and Dellacha (2007) argue that private proponents consider that 
governments can avoid unnecessary expenses by skipping a tendering process when they are confident that the original 
proponent will win or that there will not be any other proposals. Under these circumstances, direct negotiation could 
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theoretically help save the government money. However, considerations in terms of efficiency and cost of this partial 
analysis might underestimate the cost benefits of competitive bidding.  
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Statistical Appendix 
Technical Efficiency with VRS. 
The original DEA estimator proposed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), referred to as the CCR formulation, 
allows for the efficiency of any Decision Making Unit (DMU) to be measured from the maximization of a ratio of 
weighted outputs with respect to weighted inputs, subject to the restriction that similar ratios for the rest of the DMUs 
are less than or equal to the unit. 
Let 𝑋𝑖be the vector of inputs into the i
th DMU. Let 𝑌𝐼 be the corresponding vector of outputs. Let 𝑋0 be the inputs 
into a DMU whose efficiency we wish to determine, and let 𝑋0 be the outputs. So, the X's and the Y's are the data. The 
measure of efficiency for DMU0 is given by the following linear program:  
min 𝜃0                                   (1) 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝜃𝑋0                                     (2) 
                   ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝑌0                                      (3) 
𝜆 ≥ 0                                     (4) 
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where 𝜆𝑖 is the weight given to the i
th DMU in its ability to affect DMU0 and  is the efficiency of DMU0. So, the 's 
and ’s are the variables. Since DMU0 appears on the left hand side of the equations as well, the optimal  cannot 
possibly be more than 1. When we solve this linear program, we find a number of things:  
i. the efficiency of DMU0 (), with  = 1 meaning that the unit is completely efficient;  
ii. the unit's ―comparables‖ (those DMU with a nonzero ); 
iii. the ―goal‖ inputs (the difference between 𝑋0 and ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑋𝑖 ); and alternatively 
iv. we can keep inputs fixed and get goal outputs . (
1
𝜃
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑋𝑖 )  
The measurement of technical efficiency calculated by the Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) formula (referred to 
hereafter as BCC efficiency) makes it possible to find out whether there is proper use of resources in relation to the 
production of goods or services of the DMU analyzed. As for scale efficiency, it is equal to the quotient of BCC 
efficiency and CCR efficiency, and provides a measurement of the distance from the analyzed DMU to a virtual DMU 
that operates with the most productive scale size (MPSS). 
For this purpose, these authors suggest a single difference between the envelopment of the BCC and the CCR 
formulations: the inclusion of the restriction of convexity (relating to the kth DMU):∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑘 =  1
𝑛
𝐽=1  . 
Table A1. Basic statistics: all sample. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Technical Efficiency (CRS) 209 0.079 0.081 0.004 1.000 
Technical Efficiency (VRS) 209 0.263 0.189 0.019 1.000 
Scale Efficiency (CRS/VRS) 209 0.347 0.197 0.102 1.000 
Capacity (output) 209 108.92 220.75 1.00 1820.00 
Total Investment (input) 209 206.26 345.65 1.20 2211.00 
Percent Private Funding 209 97.84 8.94 41.00 100.00 
Debt Equity Grant Ratio 87 2.62 0.99 0.67 7.33 
Notes: 
CRS: Constant Return Scale; VRS: Variable Return Scale. 
Source: Authors’ calculation from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. The World Bank. 
 
Figure A1. Efficiency Frontier output oriented. 
Source: Authors’ creation from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. The World Bank 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics by country: Mean values. 
Country  Number 
of 
Projects 
TE 
(CRS) 
TE 
(VRS) 
SE Capacity Total 
Investment 
Percent 
Private 
Funding 
Debt 
Equity 
Grant 
Ratio 
Albania 6 0.119 0.172 0.701 9.12 9.77 100.00          
Argentina 4 0.048 0.199 0.243 56.25 145.75 100.00 2.10 
Bangladesh 7 0.193 0.617 0.307 226.14 203.29 100.00 1.72 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1 0.056 0.333 0.169 300.00 661.90 100.00 1.94 
Brazil 25 0.106 0.359 0.266 198.84 310.30 94.64 2.09 
Bulgaria 8 0.039 0.082 0.588 13.46 46.23 100.00 2.23 
Chile 6 0.062 0.198 0.358 53.22 118.50 100.00          
China 14 0.080 0.205 0.375 27.14 51.28 100.00 2.61 
India 38 0.092 0.320 0.318 103.47 133.67 100.00 2.54 
Indonesia 3 0.048 0.149 0.410 33.07 96.00 100.00 3.17 
Jordan 1 0.085 0.438 0.194 240.00 350.00 100.00 3.35 
Kenya 2 0.085 0.351 0.241 85.00 126.00 100.00 2.92 
Lao PDR 2 0.083 0.333 0.237 119.50 250.71 92.50          
Malaysia 3 0.050 0.247 0.364 339.83 754.73 86.67 4.00 
Mexico 2 0.053 0.294 0.179 270.00 663.00 100.00 2.33 
Mongolia 1 0.052 0.212 0.244 50.00 120.00 75.00 2.33 
Morocco 3 0.052 0.321 0.157 386.67 1101.67 91.67 2.67 
Nepal 1 0.057 0.275 0.206 120.00 262.90 100.00 1.94 
Nicaragua 2 0.046 0.130 0.443 24.50 65.00 100.00 2.41 
Pakistan 9 0.066 0.232 0.290 57.21 134.54 93.33 3.24 
Peru 3 0.056 0.332 0.179 360.00 673.00 100.00 3.29 
Philippines 3 0.083 0.291 0.350 161.00 317.63 100.00 2.33 
Romania 7 0.053 0.236 0.254 100.41 211.47 100.00 2.42 
Russian Federation 1 0.023 0.035 0.662 2.40 13.00 100.00          
Serbia 2 0.041 0.046 0.905 1.60 5.70 100.00 4.00 
South Africa 18 0.038 0.161 0.251 59.78 226.89 91.78 2.74 
Sri Lanka 5 0.092 0.305 0.519 6.94 12.80 99.00                 
Thailand 9 0.086 0.259 0.476 194.44 169.49 100.00                 
Turkey 11 0.079 0.275 0.320 107.05 234.61 100.00 2.07 
Uganda 1 0.051 0.122 0.418 14.00 34.00 100.00 2.03 
Ukraine 5 0.048 0.123 0.436 26.24 96.44 100.00          
Uruguay 2 0.024 0.111 0.168 57.35 1160.50 100.00          
Vietnam 4 0.106 0.223 0.547 30.15 42.20 100.00 2.52 
Source: Authors’ calculation from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. The World  
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